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This paper examines the costs of recent sovereign defaults using synthetic
control methods, a novel econometric technique based on comparative case
studies. Evidence on the eects of debt crises is thus presented on a case-by-
case basis, uncovering large variations in country-specic experiences. Our
estimates of cumulated output losses, e.g., range between 8.5% and 23%
depending on the considered default episode. Further dierences concern
the persistence and likely causes of these costs. In particular, our results are
consistent with the selective use of direct trade sanctions as punishment for
sovereign defaults.
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11. Introduction
International law oers little protection to creditors of sovereign borrowers who decide to
repudiate their debt. Nevertheless, sovereign defaults are relatively rare and governments
are often reluctant to use this option even in situations when their debt burden is
clearly unsustainable. These two seemingly contradictory characteristics of sovereign
debt markets have been conrmed again during the recent, still unresolved crisis in
Greece. Economic theory oers a common explanation for both of them: defaults must
be a costly and thus unattractive choice for sovereign borrowers. This idea has prompted
a growing literature that attempts to quantify dierent dimensions of default costs. We
argue that most of these studies share a common shortcoming as they implicitly assume
that each sovereign faces identical costs in the event of default. This seems unrealistic,
given that past default episodes diered in many respects, perhaps most notably in the
way creditors were treated. The recently proposed voluntary restructuring of Greece's
debt, e.g., was not preceded by any missed principal or interest payments. Argentina's
government, by contrast, unilaterally suspended all debt service in 2001, subsequently
delayed the restructuring process and nally confronted its creditors with a take-it-or-
leave-it oer which implied an average haircut of more than 75%. Foreign governments
and investors are likely to take these dierences in debtor behavior into account when
deciding on sanctions and future investments. We would thus expect to nd dierent
economic costs for both events. Our major contribution to the literature is to provide
empirical evidence for this heterogeneity in default costs.
On the methodological side, we propose the application of a novel econometric tech-
nique based on comparative case studies which is ideally suited to investigate hetero-
geneous responses to rare events. This method, originally developed by Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) and rened by Abadie et al. (2010) builds on the idea that coun-
terfactual outcomes for a unit subject to some binary treatment can be estimated as
a weighted average of outcomes for similar units that have not received the treatment
under study. The weights are optimally chosen in a way that minimizes selection bias
and mitigates endogeneity as they ensure close anity between the treated unit and its
synthetically created counterpart. The treatment eect can then be estimated as the
dierence between actual and hypothetical outcomes. In macroeconomic applications
of this synthetic control estimator, units refer to countries and the list of already ana-
lyzed \treatments" comprises trade liberalizations (Nannicini and Billmeier, 2011), the
introduction of structural reforms (Campos and Kinoshita, 2010) and the decision to
2join a monetary union (Sanso-Navarro, 2011) or to follow a specic monetary strategy
(Lee, 2011). We add to this literature by dening a sovereign's decision to default as
the relevant treatment and the associated economic costs as our outcome variables of
interest. Using this denition we then oer an in-depth analysis of ve recent episodes
of sovereign debt crises1 investigating both costs in terms of GDP per capita and their
likely causes.
Our results support the general notion of costly sovereign defaults and our hypothesis
of heterogeneity in default costs. Country-specic estimates of cumulated output losses,
e.g., range between 8.5% and 23%. Further dierences emerge in the medium run when
the default costs either turn out to be transitory or permanent. Taken together, these
two observations imply that the welfare consequences of a specic default decision might
dier markedly from those of the \average default". In fact, achieving the most favorable
outcome after a default might be of similar importance to a sovereign as the decision to
enter or circumvent the default status in the rst place.
The ndings presented in this paper also point to heterogeneity in the relative impor-
tance of the dierent channels through which sovereign defaults might impair economic
activity. Neither of the two most popular explanations for default costs, resting either
on trade sanctions or on capital market exclusion ts all of the debt crises in our sample.
Evidence for a signicant reduction in total exports, e.g., has only been found for one
of the ve defaulting countries. This result does not rule out the possibility of bilat-
eral trade sanctions whose eects may not be detected in aggregate data. Our evidence
is indeed consistent with a selective use of these sanctions as we nd two incidences
of a stronger than average reduction in bilateral trade with former creditor countries.
Support for a punishment by international capital markets in the form of reduced FDI
inows is much weaker in comparison. Here, no signicant eects are found for any
defaulting country in the sample.
Our work is related to several strands of the literature. On the empirical side we add
to the numerous studies that investigate dierent dimensions of default costs. These
contributions have already documented signicant default costs in terms of forgone GDP
growth (Sturzenegger, 2004; Borensztein and Panizza, 2009; Furceri and Zdzienicka,
2011), reduced foreign trade (Rose, 2005; Borensztein and Panizza, 2010; Martinez and
1The list of analyzed events includes the default episodes of Pakistan (1998 - 1999), Ecuador (1999 -
2000), Argentina (2001), Uruguay (2003) and of the Dominican Republic (2005). See subsection 3.1
for a detailed discussion of our sample.
3Sandleris, 2011) and deterred inows of private capital (Arteta and Hale, 2008; Fuentes
and Saravia, 2010).2 Common to all of these studies is the utilization of a panel regression
framework in which default costs are estimated by a single coecient on a dummy
variable indicating sovereign defaults. The focus is thus on the average default costs
and not on the heterogeneous nature of the responses which is the subject of our paper.
However, the wide range of results obtained by studies with similar methodology but
dierent samples may be taken as indicative of varying default costs as noted by Furceri
and Zdzienicka (2011). According to their study, estimated eects of sovereign defaults
on GDP growth range between ve and ten percentage points, depending on the data
set used.3
The theoretical literature on sovereign debt crises is also relevant for our research as it
highlights the mechanisms through which dierences in default costs might arise. Unfor-
tunately, cost heterogeneity is seldom modeled explicitly. The seminal work of Grossman
and Van Huyck (1988) which dierentiates between excusable and inexcusable default
is a rare exception. In their framework, only inexcusable defaults generate costs while
excusable defaults remain unpunished. Following this line of thought, one is tempted to
attribute heterogeneity in default costs to dierent debtor actions or external circum-
stances that inuence whether a default is perceived as more or less excusable. This
consideration, however, is not completely consistent with the model, which implies that
punishment is not an equilibrium outcome. Another model that does not share this
feature is oered by Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005). Here, heterogeneity is introduced by
the presence of dierent types of governments whose nature is unknown to private in-
vestors. Sovereign defaults convey information to the private sector as they increase the
probability that the incumbent government is of the \bad" type and thus more likely
to default again in the nearby future. Incorporating this information investors con-
sequentially demand higher interests rates which depress production in the defaulting
economy. \Good" governments for which a default is optimal thus have an incentive to
signal their type, thereby reducing their default costs.4 Further, informal arguments for
heterogeneity could be made in the context of theories that rest on direct punishments.
The number and severity of trade sanctions imposed after a default, e.g., are likely to be
2See Panizza et al. (2009) for a survey of this literature.
3These dierences in average eects, although large in economic terms, are not statistically signicant.
This, however, does not rule out the existence of signicant dierences in the costs of individual
crisis episodes.
4In the model of Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005) the signal takes the form of a delay in the default
decision. In practice, the adaption of creditor friendly policies during the restructuring process
might be viewed as an additional signal which is only chosen by benign governments.
4a function of debtor behavior. Dierences within the group of aected creditors might
introduce additional variations in default costs as some lending countries might be more
inclined to sanction delinquent debtors than others.
Finally, several studies share our interest in heterogeneity but focus on the character-
istics rather than on the consequences of sovereign debt crises. Dierences in investor
losses have been documented by Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2008) and Cruces and
Trebesch (2011), among others. Wright (2011) and Trebesch (2011) also reveal large vari-
ations in the length of the debt restructuring process. Enderlein et al. (2011) classify
sovereign defaults according to a composite index of government behavior, uncovering
both, episodes of cooperative crises resolution and cases of highly aggressive government
policies. Each dimension of heterogeneity could introduce dierences in default costs
according to the theories discussed above. First evidence for this idea is provided by
Trebesch (2010) and Cruces and Trebesch (2011). Focusing on punishment through in-
ternational capital markets, their results indicate that a harsher treatment of private
creditors increases default costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the synthetic
control estimator and oers a discussion of its relationship to alternative estimation
techniques. Section 3 describes the selected default episodes, the measures of default
costs and our choice of control variables. The results are presented in section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2. Methodology: The Synthetic Control Estimator
2.1. Basic Idea and Estimation
The synthetic control estimator rst proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and
recently rened by Abadie et al. (2010) has its roots in the comparative case study
approach to policy evaluation. This method is based on the idea that causal eects of
policy interventions or other events can be estimated by comparing over time outcomes
for one or few treated units with those of a control group. Implicit in this approach is
the assumption that the units in the control group constitute unbiased estimates of the
counterfactual, i.e. the outcome we would have observed in absence of the intervention.
To see this formally, let Defi;t = f0;1g be a dummy variable indicating the treatment
5status of country i at time t. In the context of this study the \treatment" refers to
the occurrence of a sovereign default (Defi;t = 1). The outcome of interest, Yi;t, is an
indicator of economic activity that is related to the channels highlighted in the literature
on the costs of sovereign debt crises. The default indicator's binary nature implies that
there are two potential outcomes for each country at each point of time which we denote
with Y def
i;t if Defit = 1 and with Y nodef
i;t otherwise. Observed outcomes can then be














i;t + i;t Defi;t (1)
for i = 1;:::;J + 1 and t = 1;:::;T. The dierence i;t between potential outcomes
measures the costs of sovereign defaults for country i at time t. To simplify the exposition
we now assume that only one of the J+1 countries in the sample is exposed to a sovereign
debt crisis from time T0 (with 1  T0  T) onwards. This country is indexed by i = 1:
Defi;t =
(
1 if i = 1 and t  T0
0 else
We thus can estimate the default costs as
^ 1;t = ^ Y
def
1;t   ^ Y
nodef
1;t = Y1;t   ^ Y
nodef
1;t for t  T0 (2)
which requires an estimate of the counterfactual Y nodef
1;t . In a traditional comparative
case study individual observed outcomes of the J countries that have not experienced
a crisis in the observation period { or simple averages of them { would be used. The
success of this strategy critically depends on the characteristics of the comparison unit
selected or generated from the donor pool5. A randomly chosen country may provide a
poor estimate since sovereign defaults typically occur in countries with a worse than av-
erage macroeconomic and political environment (see, e.g., Kohlscheen, 2010 or Celasun
5Throughout this study the term \donor pool" is used as synonym for the group of potential comparison
countries for which no sovereign default was observed in the sample period.
6and Harms, 2011). A selection bias will thus be introduced if these weak fundamen-
tals inuence the future path of Y1;t even in the absence of default, which seems likely.
The work on statistical matching techniques suggests that this bias can be eliminated
by ensuring that those countries constituting the counterfactual match the relevant co-
variates as closely as possible. This poses a dicult problem as no single country or a
simple average of countries is likely to provide a satisfying t in terms of all confounding
variables.
The synthetic control estimator improves on existing methods of generating comparison
units in comparative case studies by replacing subjective judgements of similarity with a
data-driven procedure that mitigates selection bias. The central idea is to use a weighted
average of members from the donor pool to create a \synthetic" country without a default
experience. The nonnegative weights collected in the vector W = (w2;:::;wJ+1)0 with
PJ+1
j=2 wj = 1 are chosen in a way to ensure that the hypothetical country resembles the
defaulting country as closely as possible in the period before the outbreak of the crisis.
Both pre-crises realizations of the main variable of interest (Yi;1;:::;Yi;T0 1) and those of
other important covariates are used to assess the degree of similarity. Given the optimal
weights (w
2;:::;w








jYj;t for t  T0 . (3)
To see how the estimator is obtained in practice, let Xi be a (r  1) vector of ob-
served covariates that are not aected by the sovereign default. These variables can
be time-varying although this is not indicated by an additional index. Linear combi-






s Yi;s with the superscript Km referring to a specic vector of weights
Km = (km
1 ;:::;km
T0 1)0. We use M of these linear combinations dened by the vectors
K1;:::;KM together with the variables in Xi to assess and optimize the degree of sim-
ilarity between the defaulting country and its hypothetical counterpart. In principle,
each pre-default value of Yi;t could constitute a distinct  Y
Km
i .6 However, a smaller num-
ber of linear combinations { each of them measuring for example an average value of Yi;t
for a specic subperiod { is likely to be sucient in most applications.
6This would imply M = T0   1 with  Y
Km
i = Yi;m for each m = 1;:::;T0   1.
7The r +M = q relevant characteristics of the defaulting country are then arranged into









with dimension (q  1). Each column of the
(q  J) matrix Z0 contains the same variables for one of the J non-defaulting countries
in the donor pool. The optimal country weights collected in W  then minimize the
distance
kZ1   Z0Wkv =
q
(Z1   Z0W)
0 V (Z1   Z0W) (4)
subject to wj  0 (j = 2;:::;J + 1) and
PJ+1
j=2 wj = 1. The optimal vector W 
thus depends on the weights of the dierent explanatory variables contained in the
positive denite diagonal matrix V . One can think of these weights as reecting the
relative importance of the dierent determinants of future Y1;t. Following Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) we obtain the elements of V as those
weights that minimize the variable of interest's root mean squared prediction error in
the pre-default period.
2.2. Relation to Alternative Estimation Techniques
Most of the empirical work on the costs of sovereign debt crises is conducted using xed-
eects panel estimation techniques. Although the synthetic control estimator is much
more general, it can also be expressed in terms of a linear model that highlights the
similarities between both approaches. Consider the factor model
Yi;t = t + ti + tXi + it Defi;t +i;t : (5)
Here, t and t represent unknown common factor loadings, i is an unobserved country-
specic eect, t is a (1  r) vector of coecients and i;t are random disturbances.
With time-invariant values for t and under the additional assumption of a common
crisis eect for all countries (it = jt 8i;j = 1;:::;J + 1) we get the usual xed-eects
model employed for example by Borensztein and Panizza (2009). Abadie et al. (2010)
show that the synthetic control estimator is valid in the more general model of equation
(5) in the sense that the dierence between 1t and ^ 1t will be close to zero if the
number of pre-default periods is large relative to the scale of random disturbances and













In the realistic case of a close but non-perfect t, the above statement will hold ap-
proximately. The synthetic control estimator can thus be seen as a generalization of
traditional panel methods that allows for heterogeneous treatment eects and time-
varying xed eects. This last generalization will be non-trivial if there are important
determinants of economic activity that are (1) not readily observable, (2) correlated
with the occurrence of sovereign debt crises and (3) subject to changes over time which
have (4) a common component for all countries. Changes in the governments' general
attitude towards the private sector may be one variable that ts into this description.
Allowing for a limited amount of time variability in unobserved country-specic char-
acteristics surely mitigates issues of endogeneity that have plagued past studies on the
costs of sovereign defaults. However, we should keep in mind that reverse causality
cannot be ruled out completely when interpreting our estimates which should thus be
considered as an upper bound for the true default costs. This problem is common to all
studies in the eld since its solution would require the utilization of convincing instru-
ments. These variables that should be correlated with defaults but not with economic
activity have not yet been found and might even not exist (Borensztein and Panizza,
2009).7
Among the studies which use the xed-eects estimator to assess the costs of sovereign
debt crises, the one by Panizza et al. (2009) is especially close to ours as it also focuses on
recent country-specic experiences. Their approach consists of estimating an equation
for the relevant indicator of economic activity,
Yi;t = t + i + i;t ;
7Using internal instruments in a dynamic panel framework as recently done by Furceri and Zdzienicka
(2011) might be one promising way to address this issue.
9followed by a visual inspection of the residuals for the defaulting countries in the years
around the occurrence of the debt crisis. Negative residuals following the default event
are then interpreted as reecting the crisis' costs. This approach shares with ours the
advantage of allowing for country-specic default costs. However, two problems stand
out that are not present in our approach: rst, the neglect of covariates and second,
the lack of any method for assessing the statistical signicance of the estimated eects.
Since we have already discussed how we account for observed determinants of economic
activity in our approach, we next turn to the discussion of statistical inference.
2.3. Aggregation and Inference
The major strength of the synthetic control estimator lies in its ability to provide
country-specic estimates of default costs. This contrasts with the estimation of av-
erage eects typically conducted in the literature on the consequences of sovereign debt
crises. We therefore also compute average eects to allow for a comparison between the
dierent approaches and to highlight the importance of country-specic heterogeneity.
Let G be the number of default episodes in the sample. Converting the data to event
time, we now denote by ^ a1;l;g the estimated individual default costs for defaulting coun-
try g (g = 1;:::;G) l years after the outbreak of the debt crisis (l = 0;:::;T  T0). The
average eect of a debt crisis on economic activity  al is then simply estimated as





^ a1;l;g : (6)
Statistical inference is assessed in the present framework by means of placebo studies
(Abadie et al., 2010). For a single default episode g this involves applying the synthetic
control estimator to all countries in the donor pool as if they had experienced a debt
crisis in l = 0. The defaulting country is returned to the pool of potential comparison
units for this exercise. For each l = 0;:::;T   T0 this results in Jg estimated pseudo-
default costs ^ aPL
i;l;g with i = 2;:::;Jg+1.8 We expect to nd an average value of ^ aPL
i;l;g that
is close to zero since there is no common event for these countries. The accumulation
of random country-specic events, however, obviously leads to a growing dispersion of
8The superscript g indicates that the number of comparison units might vary between the dierent
case studies. We will see in subsection 3.2 that this is indeed relevant in our application as more
countries become eligible to enter the donor pool for the latest default episodes.
10placebo eects for increasing l. Our estimates of the true default costs ^ a1;l;g should not
look exceptional when compared to these placebo estimates if the null hypothesis of no
default costs were correct. The nding of abnormally negative eects for the defaulting
country can thus be interpreted as evidence for signicant default costs.
Cavallo et al. (2010) generalize the idea of placebo studies by applying it to the evaluation
of average treatment eects. In the context of our study their approach leads to the
calculation of time specic p-values for the average default costs. This involves a three-
step procedure that consists of
1. Conducting for each sovereign default g all Jg placebo studies as outlined above.
2. Calculating for each l = 0;:::;T   T0 every possible average placebo eect ^  aPL
l;s ,
s = 1;:::;N. These are computed by selecting one of the Jg event-time specic
estimates of pseudo-default costs ^ aPL












The number of possible averages is given by N =
QG
g=1 Jg.
















The p-value thus measures the probability of observing a drop in average economic
activity larger than ^  al under the null hypothesis of zero default costs.
9Here, the notation i(g) indicates that the index number of the chosen placebo studies need not be
the same for all G default episodes. In fact, averages are calculate for all possible combinations of
country-specic pseudo default costs.
113. Data Issues
3.1. Case Study Selection
We investigate the costs of sovereign defaults for ve emerging market economies that
suered from debt crises during the past fourteen years. Our selection covers the spec-
tacular default of Argentina in 2001 that had not been resolved until 2005 as well as
the perhaps less well known default episodes of Pakistan (1998 - 1999), Ecuador (1999
- 2000), Uruguay (2003) and the Dominican Republic (2005). We do not include the
Russian (1998 - 2000), Ukrainian (1998 - 2000) or Moldovian (2002) debt crises since the
economic performance of these countries is heavily inuenced by their transition from
centrally planned to market economies prior to default. The synthetic control estimator
is not well suited to deal with such additional events in the pre-treatment period that
are not shared with the majority of countries in the control group. The temporal clus-
tering of crises in the nineteen eighties and the consequential reduction in the number of
admissible comparison countries without a debt crisis also prevented us from considering
earlier default episodes.10 Our sample of defaults is thus a subset of the one analyzed by
Panizza et al. (2009), allowing a comparison of the results obtained by standard panel
and our synthetic control methods.
 insert Table 1 here 
Table 1 contains some key characteristics of the default events in our sample. Several
dierences between theses episodes stand out. First, there is considerable variation in the
length of the restructuring process. While the defaults of Uruguay and the Dominican
Republic were resolved relatively smoothly within the year of default, a settlement with
the creditors was delayed for up to four years in the remaining cases. The length of
the default period may have important implications for the crises' cost since sovereigns
typically can not tap debt markets until several years have elapsed after the settlement
(Gelos et al., 2011).
Second, defaulting countries also dier in terms of the harshness with which they con-
fronted their creditors. Uruguay, e.g., reached an agreement with its bondholders before
10We do not include more recent debt crises like the one of Ecuador (2008 - 2009) or the Seychelles
(2008 - 2010) either. Here, the reason is a lack of sucient post-default data points.
12any payment was missed and imposed only a moderate haircut of 9.8 percent. This
benign stance is also reected in the index of coerciveness developed by Enderlein et al.
(2011) where Uruguay obtained the lowest possible score.11 This contrasts most sharply
with the experience of Argentina which unilaterally declared a suspension of all debt
payments in 2001 and afterwards achieved a restructuring deal that left investors with
compensation worth less than 25 percent of their original claims. Again, this behavior
is also mirrored in the index of coerciveness where Argentina reached one of the highest
scores ever recorded. The three other debt crises range between these two polar cases
with the Dominican Republic acting relatively more creditor friendly than Pakistan and
Ecuador while in default. It seems obvious that these dierences in debtor behavior
should have consequences for the costs of debt crises, especially when direct forms of
punishment, e.g. through trade sanctions, are involved. The nding that higher haircuts
increase both borrowing costs and the length of market exclusion documented by Cruces
and Trebesch (2011) can be seen as rst evidence supporting this idea.
Finally, there is also cross-country variation in the governments' scal balance before the
outbreak of a crisis. The initial scal position might matter since larger decits prior
to the default increase the necessary adjustment eort when external funding dries up.
Since most of the empirical evidence now supports the view that scal consolidations are
contractionary (Pescatori et al., 2011), and especially so during nancial crises (Hutchi-
son et al., 2010), we would expect to nd larger output losses for high-decit countries
like Pakistan, Uruguay and Argentina.
Given these dierences and their likely implications, it seems questionable whether the
cost of debt crises can be adequately captured by a common crisis dummy in a panel
regression. The case study approach pursued in this study seems better suited to address
issues of country-specic heterogeneity.
To estimate the case specic costs of the ve recent crises mentioned above, the synthetic
control estimator requires a control group of similar countries that have not been exposed
to a sovereign default. We consider all emerging market economies rated by Standard
& Poor's as potential members of this donor pool.12 From these countries we discard
11Ranging from 1 (investor friendly) to 10 (completely uncooperative) this index provides a classication
of governments actions during sovereign debt disputes. We thank Christoph Trebesch for sharing
this data with us.
12We dene those countries as emerging market economies that do not fall into the World Bank's
OECD or non OECD high income classication. We further add the Central and Eastern European
transition economies since their graduation to developed country status took place after most of the
debt crises in our sample occurred. Major oil-exporting countries are not considered.
13those with a default event as dened by Standard & Poor's in the case-study specic
pre- or post-treatment period. The relevant time window starts nine years before the
occurrence of the sovereign default under study and ends either in 2009 or up to seven
years after this event.13 To broaden the country base in the presence of the long-lasting
defaults of the nineteen eighties and nineteen nineties we also consider those countries
as eligible to enter the donor pool that had a pending default for more than ve years at
the beginning of the event window. Since sovereign debt crises were relatively rare in the
last two decades, our criterion for exclusion leads to a growing number of comparison
countries for the more recent default episodes. Appendix A illustrates the changing
composition of the donor pool for our analysis of the eect of debt crises on GDP per
capita. Similar trends can be observed for our other indicators of default costs although
small dierences are possible due to variations in data availability on our variables of
interest.
3.2. Dependent and Control Variables
Our choice of dependent variables reects the two dierent objectives which we pursue
in this paper. We rst want to provide country-specic estimates of the output losses
incurred during the default episodes. These are obtained by comparing the evolution
of the defaulting countries' logarithmized GDP per capita (lngdp) with those of their
respective synthetically created counterparts.14 The dierence between both values thus
approximates at each point in time the percentage output loss due to the crisis. Since
our estimation window stretches several years after the resolution of each crisis we can
also assess whether defaults are followed by rapid recoveries (Yeyati and Panizza, 2011)
or by persistently lower levels of GDP as documented for other nancial crises (Cerra
and Saxena, 2008).
Second, we also try to shed some light on the relative importance of the dierent channels
through which sovereign defaults might impair economic activity. Here, we analyze two
channels that have received much attention in the literature, one operating through
13The length of the pre-default period reects a compromise between the time-series and cross-sectional
dimension of our sample. An increase in the length of the matching period reduces the number of
comparison units in the donor pool as fewer countries meet the no-default criterion. Our results,
however, are robust to alternative time windows.
14 The analysis of GDP levels instead of growth rates is common in macroeconomic applications of
the synthetic control estimator, see e.g. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) or Nannicini and Billmeier
(2011).
14a decline in trade (Rose, 2005; Martinez and Sandleris, 2011) and the other through
a reduction in private capital ows (Fuentes and Saravia, 2010). More precisely, we
focus on the eect of debt crises on the defaulting countries' exports and FDI inows.
Government sanctions or a reassessment of credit and expropriation risk by the private
sector could provide the link between sovereign defaults and economic activity in either
case.
We employ two dierent approaches to investigate the importance of the outlined chan-
nels. For both exports and FDI ows we use aggregate variables (lnexports and lnfdi),
standardized in the same way as the GDP series since these measures should be the most
important ones from the defaulting country's point of view. However, since losses due to
the default are typically not shared equally among creditors of all countries coordinated
sanctions also seem unlikely. Isolated actions by important creditor governments may be
a more plausible outcome that does not show up in aggregate data. One way to deal with
this problem in the present framework would be to analyze the fraction of total exports
(FDI inows) that is directed to (originates from) the aected creditor countries. Since
information on the origins of private creditors is not available we have to resort to data
on aected ocial creditors for these exercises. This data is available for those three
countries in our sample (the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Pakistan) that also rene-
gotiated ocial debt through the Paris Club during their default period.15 We further
restrict our attention to the eects of sovereign defaults on export shares (rel exports).
A similar analysis was precluded for FDI ows as too many of the relevant data points
are missing in standard bilateral FDI databases like the OECD's \International Direct
Investment Statistics Yearbook".
Our choice of control variables has been guided by the related literature. Specically, we
follow Nannicini and Billmeier (2011) and consider the population growth rate (n), the
physical investment share (s) and the average years of secondary schooling (av2school)
as important determinants of GDP per capita. We further control for the political regime
by including the popular Polity 2 variable (polity2) from the Polity IV database since
political institutions might matter for both, the probability and the eects of nancial
crises (Cavallo and Cavallo, 2010).
In our export specication we try to control for the eect of changing commodity prices
that might have exerted a positive inuence on export performance during some of
15The same data has also been used in related studies by Rose (2005), Fuentes and Saravia (2010) and
Martinez and Sandleris (2011).
15the recent debt crises (Panizza et al., 2009). We attempt to achieve this by adding
two measures of commodity dependence to our set of control variables, assuming that
countries with similar export shares of agricultural (agr) and fossil products (fossils)
also react similar to changing prices. Following the large literature on the gravity model
of international trade we further include a measure of geographical distances. We choose
the log of the average distance between the defaulting country and its creditors (lndist)
when analyzing the eect of debt crises on the fraction of total exports directed to these
countries. In our study of total exports per capita this variable is replaced by a measure
of latitude (latitude) as an aggregate indicator of a country's geographical position.
Finally, we follow Naude and Krugell (2007) and include a measure of ethnic fractional-
ization (ethnic) as an indicator for social cohesion and conict in addition to the already
described proxies of human capital (av2school) and geography (latitude) in our FDI
specication. We further add the numbers of mobile cellular subscriptions (mobiles)
and telephone lines (telephones) to our matching criteria. Both variables approximate
the physical capital stock as another important determinant of expected returns on FDI.
Appendix B contains detailed information on the construction and the data sources for
all included dependent and explanatory variables.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Sovereign Defaults and Overall Economic Development
We start our empirical investigation by analyzing the eect of debt crises on GDP per
capita. Our set of predictor variables for future economic activity consists of pre-default
averages of the control variables discussed in subsection 3.2 augmented with some linear
combinations of the dependent variable. For the exogenous variables, average values
are calculated over an eight year window that starts nine years before the occurrence
of a sovereign default. The year that precedes the default event is thus excluded from
the matching period and serves as intervention date T0. This timing assumption sug-
gested by Abadie et al. (2010) allows us to control for the costs introduced by the
anticipation of the crisis. For the dependent variable, we use the last two values of
the pre-intervention period (T0   1 and T0   2) together with two subperiod averages
(calculated over [T0   3;T0   5] and [T0   6;T0   8]) as additional matching criteria for
the synthetic control estimator.
16Table 2 shows the results of the optimization procedure.16 A comparison of the predictor
variables for the defaulting countries to those of their synthetically created counterparts
depicts a quite reasonable in-sample t for all ve countries. For those measures based on
the lagged dependent variable, dierences are especially small and typically in the range
of one to two percent. However, the achieved degree of similarity is also satisfying when
judged by the other control variables, in particular when the large degree of heterogeneity
in the donor pool is considered.17 Examining the dependent variable's root mean squared
prediction error (RMSPE) further supports our impression of the goodness of t although
the results are somewhat weaker for Ecuador and Uruguay than for the other three
countries.
 insert Table 2 here 
The last rows in Table 2 list those countries from the donor pool that constitute the es-
timated counterfactual.18 The choice of comparison units without a sucient individual
degree of similarity to the treated unit poses the risk of introducing an interpolation bias
(Abadie et al., 2010) that might have been not completely absent in past macroeconomic
applications of the synthetic control estimator. A glance at the countries which are cho-
sen by the optimization routine mitigates these concerns in the present study. Most
control countries are either characterized by geographical proximity to the respective
defaulting country (e.g. countries from Latin America account for 60 % of synthetic Ar-
gentina's country weights, India is the second most important contributor to Pakistan's
control group) or seem at least similarly exposed to the risk of sovereign debt crises.
A visual impression of the degree of similarity between the actual and synthetic de-
faulting countries prior and after the default can be gauged from Figure 1. Here, solid
lines depict the actual time paths of the logarithmized GDP per capita series for the
ve crises countries. Maybe with the exception of Ecuador, these are at rst closely
tracked by the dashed lines corresponding to the outcome of the same variable for the
synthetically created comparison countries. As it is required for admissible estimates of
the counterfactual outcomes, the achieved degree of synchronization seems high even at
business cycle frequencies during the pre-crises periods. Actual and synthetic outcomes
16All optimizations are conducted in STATA using the synth routine developed by Abadie et al. (2010).
17In the case of Argentina (2001) country-specic values in the donor pool ranged between  0:4 and
2:66 for the population growth rate, between 12:96 and 41:91 for the investment share, between 0:73
and 4:25 years for schooling variable and between  6:75 and 10 for the polity score.
18Only the ve most important countries with an individual weight of a least one percent are shown.
17diverge after the end of the matching period. In each of the ve cases, actual GDP
per capital drops below its estimated counterfactual in the year preceding the default
(indicated by the rst vertical line) and stays there in the default year (second vertical
line).
 insert Figure 1 here 
Closer inspection of the individual graphs in Figure 1 also reveals some striking dier-
ences between the ve default episodes. First, there are large variations in the level
of default costs. The maximum dierence between actual and counterfactual GDP per
capita ranges between 8:5% (Dominican Republic) and 23:1% (Pakistan). While seem-
ingly large, the size of these estimates are in line with those obtained by Panizza et al.
(2009) using the alternative techniques described in subsection 2.2.19 Second, dierences
can be observed regarding the time path of default costs. In three of the ve cases the
bulk of the costs was incurred in the year prior to the default. Only Argentina and
Ecuador suered more in the default year than in the period of looming debt crises.
These dierences may be due to the fact that both countries defaulted relatively late
in the year { in the fourth and third quarter respectively { as stressed by Yeyati and
Panizza (2011). However, it also seems possible that these experiences at least partly
reect the harsh treatment of creditors by the Argentinian and Ecuadorian governments.
A related observation is that only the Dominican Republic and Uruguay, the two coun-
tries that were ranked the most creditor friendly in Table 1, were able to recuperate
the output loss completely in the years after the crisis. Output losses seem more or less
permanent in the remaining three countries although they also experienced periods of
strong growth in GDP per capita starting several years after the default. These devel-
opments, however, also show up in the estimated counterfactuals suggesting that they
are not related to possibly benign eects of the crises, brought about e.g., through a
reduction of the debt burden.
 insert Figure 2 here 
Figure 2 serves two purposes. It facilitates the assessment of the magnitude of the default
costs by displaying the dierence between the actual and the estimated counterfactual
19See Figure 7 of Panizza et al. (2009) which shows the estimated default costs in terms of GDP
growth rates. Adding up their period-specic estimates leads to results that are directly comparable
to ours.
18outcome for the dependent variable (thick black lines). Even more importantly, it oers
a way to check whether these dierences are statistically signicant. As explained in
subsection 2.3 this is done by means of placebo studies whose results are displayed in grey.
Each line represents the estimated pseudo-default costs for one of the countries in the
donor pool that had not experienced a sovereign default in the sample period. Following
Abadie et al. (2010) only results for those placebo studies with a pre-intervention t
similar to the one obtained for the defaulting country are shown. More precisely, we
exclude all countries that had a mean square prediction error (MSPE) of more than ve
times the MSPE of the respective defaulting country. This procedure is based on the
reasoning that countries which could not be synthetically replicated during the matching
period are also likely to suer from the same problems out of sample. Placebo costs
calculated from these studies are therefore not well suited to evaluate the likelihood
that a given decline in economic activity occurs randomly in one of the better tted
defaulting countries.
Looking at the results presented in Figure 2 we can infer that the development of GDP
per capita is indeed unusual after the outbreak of a sovereign debt crisis. Signicant
eects are always found in the default year when the estimated default costs are at the
lower boundary of the range spanned by the placebo studies. Statistical signicance
diminishes when later dates are considered although strong eects are still found for
Pakistan even eight years after the default. This has to be expected given that the eect
of the debt crisis levels out or is even reversed while the dispersion of placebo eects
naturally increases with the time elapsed since the end of the matching period.
 insert Figure 3 here 
Figure 3 translates the country-specic experiences into the average eects typically
reported in the literature. As discussed in subsection 2.3 this requires a conversion of
calendar into event time since the ve defaults occurred in dierent years. The values on
the horizontal axis in both graphs therefore refer to the number of years that have passed
since the default year (eyears). Point estimates of the average default costs are depicted
by the solid line in the left panel. According to these estimates, GDP per capita drops
by 10.6% on average one year prior to a sovereign default relative to the counterfactual
situation without a debt crisis. The dierence between hypothetical and actual average
GDP per capita continues to grow for two additional years when it reaches a maximum
value of 14.1%. The \typical" debt crisis is then followed by a slow V-shaped recovery.
19However, even seven years after the default average GDP per capita still falls short of
its counterfactual level.
The right panel of Figure 3 tells us that the null hypothesis of zero average default costs
can be rejected at conventional levels for most of the years. The reduction in GDP per
capita relative to the estimated counterfactual is signicant at the one percent level in
the four years around the default (from eyear = -1 to 2), at the ve percent level in the
third, and at the ten percent level in the fourth, fth and seventh year after the default.20
Our evidence is therefore in line with previous studies which mostly document sizeable
and statistically signicant average default costs (see, e.g., Borensztein and Panizza
(2009) or Furceri and Zdzienicka (2011)). The focus on average eects, however, might
be misleading as it masks the country-specic heterogeneity which is apparently present
in our sample. To highlight this point once more, we plot the individually estimated
country-specic default costs along with their average in the left graph. The documented
deviations from the average default costs are clearly not of second-order importance from
the perspective of a policy maker dealing with an emerging sovereign debt crisis.
4.2. Sovereign Defaults and Exports
The documented contemporaneous decline in international trade has been repeatedly
put forward as an explanation for the poor economic performance of many countries
suering from a sovereign debt crisis (Rose, 2005; Martinez and Sandleris, 2011). We
therefore investigate whether this channel also operated in our sample of recent de-
faults by applying the synthetic control estimator to the exports per capita series as
our preferred measure of foreign trade. Following Martinez and Sandleris (2011) we also
contribute to the discussion on the importance of direct sanctions as explanation for the
changes in trade patterns observed in the aftermath of sovereign debt crises. As these are
more likely to be imposed by creditor countries, we conjecture that their bilateral trade
with the defaulting country is more strongly aected than its trade with other countries.
Hence, we also analyze the fraction of total exports that is directed to creditor countries.
We discuss the results for each of the two specications in turn.
20The increase in statistical signicance of the estimated average eect in the seventh year is partly due
to the fact that Uruguay and the Dominican Republic { the two countries with the fastest recovery
{ drop out of the calculation as they defaulted relatively late in the sample period.
20Table 3 shows the optimal country weights and the resulting t in the pre-default pe-
riod for the exports per capita specication. It is evident from the rst three rows that
the relevant exogenous variables have not been as closely matched as those inuenc-
ing GDP per capita discussed earlier. This can be partly explained by the weighting
scheme employed by the synthetic control estimator which tolerates larger deviations for
matching variables with relative low predictive power for the dependent variable prior
to the default event.21 This eect is intended as it is accompanied by an improved t for
variables that are likely to be strong predictors of future exports per capita. Another
possible explanation points to the high degree of export specialization documented for
Argentina, Ecuador and Uruguay. Their large export shares of commodity related prod-
ucts could not be reproduced by convex combinations of the non-defaulting countries.
An imperfect matching of these variables is therefore technically inevitable.
Notwithstanding these caveats, the country weights chosen by the optimization routine
and displayed in the last rows of Table 3 still seem reasonable in terms of geographic and
economic proximity. For all ve countries, pre-default realizations of the dependent vari-
able are also closely matched by their synthetically created counterparts although the
weakest t is again obtained for Uruguay when measured by the RMSPE. This impres-
sion is conrmed by Figure 4 which shows for each country the dierence between the
log of actual and hypothetical exports per capita (thick black line). Only small uctua-
tions around zero can be observed prior to the years preceding the default events. This
pattern changes with the outbreak of the debt crises after which exports per capita per-
sistently fall short of their estimated counterfactual values in four of the ve economies.
The only exception is Uruguay whose estimated counterfactual is dominated by the poor
performance of Jamaica, its most important constituent. However, heterogeneity in the
country-specic reactions is evident even among the four countries for which the point
estimates indicate that the eect of sovereign defaults on international trade is negative.
Four years after the default the percentage deviation from the estimated counterfactual
level of exports per capita ranges from 5% for Ecuador to close to 50% for Argentina.
Figure 4 also shows the output from the placebo studies for each of the ve crises. The
negative eects found for Ecuador, Pakistan and, depending on the considered year, also
those for the Dominican Republic, turn out to be insignicant according to these results.
Only Argentina's underperformance relative to its estimated counterfactual consistently
appears exceptional when compared to the set of outcomes for countries not aected by
21Technically this corresponds to smaller weights of these variables in the weighting matrix V .
21a sovereign debt crisis. This result is noteworthy as it contrasts with those of Panizza
et al. (2009) who nd a strong increase in Argentina's exports starting shortly after the
default.22 Their approach, which only controls for a common time trend and country-
specic eects probably confuses the commodity driven regional export boom with the
eect of Argentina's debt crisis. The synthetic control estimator is much better suited to
capture these confounding eects. Indeed, our results indicate that Argentina's export
performance would have been even better in the absence of its default in 2001.
Considered together, our ve case studies suggest that the average eect of sovereign
defaults on foreign trade, depicted in Figure 5, is quite small. In the default year, average
exports per capita are 6.6 percent below their estimated counterfactual level. This value
increases to 14.9 percent in the third year after the default after which the gap between
actual and hypothetical export per capita narrows. Only the eects in the year before
and two years after the default are statistically signicant at the 10 percent level. Our
estimates of the trade related default costs are thus far below those reported in the
literature. Martinez and Sandleris (2011), e.g., nd an average impact of sovereign debt
crises on trade of -6.5% in each of the rst ve years after the default which corresponds to
an aggregate negative eect of more than 30 percent in our framework. When comparing
these ndings one has to consider that our results on average eects are quite sensitive to
outliers as the sample of default events is admittedly small. Excluding Uruguay, whose
post-default experience has clearly been exceptional, would lead to estimated average
eects of similar magnitude to those in the literature.23
We next turn to the question whether the developments in aggregate trade patterns
around the default events considered so far mask cases of bilateral punishment by creditor
countries, e.g. through trade sanctions. If this were the case, we would expect the
fraction of total exports directed to creditor countries to decline after a sovereign default.
Table 4 documents the in-sample properties for a specication that uses this indicator
as dependent variable. The export fractions prior to the default have been reproduced
almost perfectly for each of the three countries in our sample.24 In the case of the
Dominican Republic, whose creditors have also been responsible for 90% of its exports,
this could only be achieved by selecting a single country, Mexico, as comparison unit.
22This can be inferred from Figure 6 on page 37 of their publication.
23Without Uruguay, the estimated average eect of sovereign debt crises on exports per capita is 28.6%
ve years after the default with a p-value of 0.06.
24As discussed in subsection 3.2, our sample of default events shrinks since data on aected creditor
countries is only available for those three countries which also rescheduled their debt through the
Paris Club.
22The weights are more evenly distributed for Ecuador and Pakistan where the largest
weights have again been assigned to countries from the same region. The good t of our
distance variable also reects this geographic proximity.
Figure 6 and Figure 7 depict our estimates of the individual and average eects of
debt crises on our dependent variable. Again, no common pattern emerges for all three
countries. Instead, the individual country experiences comprise (1) a persistent decline
in the fraction of exports directed to creditor countries (Dominican Republic), (2) a
temporary negative eect on export shares (Ecuador), and (3) the absence of any eect
(Pakistan). Both the transitory and the persistent eect are found to be signicant, as
only 1 out of the 14 (36) placebo experiments generated negative trajectories of larger
absolute size than those found for Ecuador (the Dominican Republic). The heterogeneity
could have been expected given that the three countries not only dier in their own
actions during the debt crises, but also defaulted on dierent groups of creditors. It is
easy to imagine that some countries are more inclined to sanction delinquent debtors than
others, thereby making dierent experiences after debt crises even more likely. When
these considerations are ignored in favor of an emphasis on average eects, one nds a
signicant decline in the fraction of exports directed to creditor countries in the rst
four years following a sovereign default. The maximum decline of 9.7 percentage points
is observed two years after the default with export market shares trending back towards
their pre-crisis levels afterwards.25 Overall, our results are consistent with the idea that
direct trade sanctions are at least used selectively to punish defaulting sovereigns. This
contrasts with the ndings of Martinez and Sandleris (2011). Relying on estimated
average eects, they do not report any evidence in favor for the sanctioning hypothesis.
4.3. Sovereign Defaults and Foreign Direct Investment
Dating back to Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) capital market exclusion is perhaps the most
common form of punishment considered in the theoretical literature on sovereign debt
and default. Financial autarky after a default is associated with two dierent types
of economic costs as it implies both, forgone benets from intertemporal consumption
smoothing and a shortfall of funds needed to nance foreign inputs to domestic pro-
duction. Naturally, these costs are more severe if the private sector is also cut o from
25The strength of the average recovery might be overstated as the jump in the export ratio in the fth
year after the default predominantly reects the fact that Uruguay drops out of the calculation.
23international capital markets after a sovereign default. Mendoza and Yue (2011) show
that key features of emerging market business cycles, among them the sharp reduction
in GDP observed during sovereign debt crises, can be replicated in a general equilibrium
model under these assumptions. In the following, we analyze whether a punishment
through international capital markets has been present during recent episodes of debt
crises. We follow Fuentes and Saravia (2010) and focus on the reaction of foreign direct
investment as it is presumably the most benecial type of capital inows (Stiglitz, 2000).
Inspection of Table 5 reveals that the defaulting countries' net FDI inows per capita
series have been much more dicult to replicate by the synthetic control estimator
than our other indicators of default costs. The t is especially poor for Argentina, the
Dominican Republic and Uruguay for which the in-sample RMSPE exceeds 10 percent.
We therefore focus our discussion on the experiences of Ecuador and Pakistan which
have been t reasonably well, both in terms of the dependent and control variables.
It can be inferred from Figure 8 that we do not nd a signicant reduction in FDI
per capita for either of the two countries during the rst few years after the default.26
While predicted and actual FDI per capita virtually coincide in the case of Pakistan even
after the default we merely observe a decreased post-default t for Ecuador without a
clear tendency towards lower than expected FDI inows.27 Given this general pattern,
it seems unlikely that the signicant negative eect found for Ecuador in 2006 can be
attributed to its default in 1999. It seems more plausible that the unpredicted reduction
in FDI inows reects an increase in political risk caused by Ecuador's 2006 presidential
election which saw the victory of Rafael Correa who actively campaigned for a new debt
restructuring (Hatchondo et al., 2009).
Unsurprisingly, the individual experiences are also reected in the estimated average
eects. Although strictly negative, the point estimates shown in Figure 9 are never
statistically signicant during the rst 6 years after a sovereign default. This contrasts
with the results of Fuentes and Saravia (2010) who nd a signicant negative impact
of sovereign defaults on FDI inows that is largely driven by a decline in funds from
26We do, however, nd a consistently negative and mostly signicant eect for Argentina. We do not
stress this result as it might well be produced by pure chance given the weak model t prior to the
default.
27Obviously, the eect is also always insignicant for Pakistan. Note that the excellent t of Pakistan's
FDI per capita series in the pre-intervention period would lead to the exclusion of all placebo
studies if the usual hurdle rate (5 times the defaulting countries' MSPE) were applied. We therefore
use an alternative criterion for exclusion based on the average MSPE measured for Argentina, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Uruguay in their respective pre-intervention periods.
24creditor countries directly aected by the default. This last nding might well explain
the dierences to our results as a lack of data availability on bilateral FDI ows precludes
us from investigating host country-specic reactions to sovereign debt crises in a way
similar to our analysis of export shares in subsection 4.2.
5. Conclusion
Information on the costs of sovereign defaults is clearly valuable from a policy perspec-
tive, especially during a time when looming debt crises threaten a growing number of
developed economies. Previous attempts to address this issue have already documented
a sizable negative impact of defaults on GDP growth, foreign trade and access to capital
markets. We contribute to this literature by oering country-specic estimates of de-
fault costs using a novel econometric technique based on comparative case studies. The
key advantage of this approach, its exibility in dealing with heterogeneity, has proved
especially useful in the present application, as our results reveal considerable variation in
the costs of crises which has not been documented in the literature so far. Our estimates
of cumulated output losses, e.g., range between 8.5% and 23% depending on the con-
sidered default episode. Further dierences emerge in the medium run when the default
costs either turn out transitory or permanent. This heterogeneity might reect a varying
degree of punishment by trading partners and investors who also seem to dierentiate
between default events.
In light of the large variation in the characteristics of the considered default episodes,
heterogeneity in default costs comes as no surprise. Dierences in the necessary scal
adjustment eort and in the details of the restructuring process are among the possi-
ble explanations. A logical next step would be to investigate this issue more formally.
Extending the sample of estimated default costs and analyzing their determinants econo-
metrically thus seems a promising avenue for future research.
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29Table 1: Characteristics of Selected Sovereign Defaults
Country Default Type of Haircut Index of Decit
period restructuring (%)a Coerciveness
b (%)c
Pakistan 1998 - 1999 Pre- & postdefault 13.1 4.5 5.9
Ecuador 1999 - 2000 Postdefault 38.3 5.5 3.3
Argentina 2001 - 2005 Postdefault 76.8 7.2 4.3
Uruguay 2003 Predefault 9.8 1.0 4.6
Dom. Rep. 2005 Pre- & postdefault 5.6 1.0 2.9
Notes: a Average for bank and bond debt, weighted with the amount of exchanged
debt. b Average over default period. c Average decit in the three years prior to default.
Sources: Panizza et al. (2009) and Cruces and Trebesch (2011) for default periods,
Cruces and Trebesch (2011) for the haircuts and Enderlein et al. (2011) for the index
of coerciveness. Data on scal decits is from Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) and
IMF (2011a).
30Table 2: Synthetic Control Estimator of GDP per Capita: Pre-Default Fit and Country Weights
Argentina (2001) DomRep (2005) Ecuador (1999) Pakistan (1998) Uruguay (2003)
Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth
Dependent variable: lngdp
n 1.29 1.21 1.63 1.45 2.01 2.29 2.51 2.26 0.53 1.07
s 21.71 21.59 21.42 24.93 25.88 22.79 21.64 21.11 17.50 21.07
av2school 2.06 2.20 2.07 2.28 2.17 2.16 1.30 1.64 2.22 2.18
polity2 7.13 7.18 8.00 7.34 8.88 8.86 8.00 7.70 10.00 8.11
lngdp(T0   6,T0   8) 9.03 9.02 8.75 8.76 8.50 8.48 7.56 7.56 9.00 8.99
lngdp(T0   3, T0   5) 9.11 9.09 8.88 8.88 8.54 8.51 7.59 7.59 9.07 9.06
lngdp(T0   2) 9.18 9.14 8.94 8.91 8.54 8.52 7.63 7.62 9.06 9.07
lngdp(T0   1) 9.14 9.13 8.89 8.92 8.56 8.57 7.62 7.64 9.02 9.05
RMSPE 0.016 0.019 0.024 0.011 0.023
Control group
a MEX(0.29) MEX(0.65) CRI(0.54) PHL (0.70) TUR(0.36)
CZE(0.29) IND(0.18) PHL(0.21) IND (0.20) CZE(0.27)
COL(0.27) BWA(0.17) BWA(0.14) PNG (0.08) JAM(0.25)
TUR(0.10) MNG(0.07) BWA (0.03) PNG(0.11)
BRA(0.04) THA(0.02)
Notes: a Only the ve most important countries with an individual weight of at least one percent are shown.
3
1Table 3: Synthetic Control Estimator of Exports per Capita: Pre-Default Fit and Country Weights
Argentina (2001) DomRep (2005) Ecuador (1999) Pakistan (1998) Uruguay (2003)
Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth
Dependent variable: lnexports
latitude 0.38 0.38 0.21 0.16 0.02 0.09 0.33 0.27 0.37 0.17
agr 55.25 28.51 18.49 13.33 54.17 33.30 18.76 16.59 58.87 32.71
fossiles 12.33 20.35 4.64 6.87 39.64 38.91 1.33 34.41 1.62 5.09
lnexports(t-6, t-8) 6.00 6.00 6.30 6.30 5.65 5.64 3.81 3.81 6.60 6.60
lnexports(t-3, t-5) 6.44 6.44 6.35 6.36 5.86 5.88 3.98 3.97 6.68 6.68
lnexports(t-2) 6.55 6.50 6.31 6.32 6.07 6.06 4.06 4.07 6.61 6.61
lnexports(t-1) 6.42 6.46 6.36 6.41 6.12 6.10 4.13 4.12 6.50 6.52
RMSPE 0.037 0.034 0.025 0.039 0.078
Control group
a CHL (0.26) PHL(0.46) COL(0.35) EGY(0.67) JAM (0.67)
BRA (0.25) JAM(0.36) PER(0.33) IND(0.33) CRI (0.29)
LTU (0.25) MEX(0.06) PNG(0.13) GTM (0.03)
HUN (0.13) MYS(0.11) SUR (0.01)
LBN (0.12) CHL(0.06)
Notes: a Only the ve most important countries with an individual weight of at least one percent are shown.
3
2Table 4: Synthetic Control Estimator of Relative Exports: Pre-Default Fit
and Country Weights
DomRep (2005) Ecuador (1999) Pakistan (1998)
Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth
Dependent variable: rel exports
agr 20.39 6.09 54.17 27.41 18.76 32.31
fossiles 5.76 10.15 39.64 39.59 1.33 3.65
lndist 8.95 9.02 9.17 9.12 8.74 9.06
rel exports(t-6, t-8) 89.02 87.06 63.53 63.48 59.17 59.17
rel exports(t-3, t-5) 90.00 88.59 61.18 60.68 59.23 59.42
rel exports(t-2) 88.57 88.79 57.55 58.35 58.23 57.60
rel exports(t-1) 86.95 88.33 57.84 57.78 56.77 58.11
RMSPE 1.472 0.769 1.100
Control group





Notes: a Only the ve most important countries with an individual weight of at least
one percent are shown.
33Table 5: Synthetic Control Estimator of Net FDI Inows per Capita: Pre-Default Fit and Country Weights
Argentina (2001) DomRep (2005) Ecuador (1999) Pakistan (1998) Uruguay (2003)
Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth
Dependent variable: lnfdi
av2school 2.06 2.72 2.07 1.90 2.14 2.06 1.30 1.11 2.22 1.86
latitude 0.38 0.28 0.21 0.35 0.02 0.12 0.33 0.22 0.37 0.37
ethnic 0.26 0.25 0.43 0.43 0.66 0.48 0.71 0.43 0.25 0.27
mobiles 3.47 3.35 9.18 18.26 0.28 0.40 0.02 0.06 6.18 8.27
telephones 16.23 12.79 9.37 20.26 5.80 4.11 1.26 1.50 23.86 23.23
lnfdi(t-6, t-8) 5.78 5.75 4.43 4.57 5.40 5.42 5.34 5.33 4.49 4.45
lnfdi(t-3, t-5) 6.02 6.07 5.22 5.16 5.52 5.51 5.35 5.34 4.58 4.65
lnfdi(t-2) 6.01 6.11 4.99 5.01 5.52 5.54 5.36 5.35 4.84 4.70
lnfdi(t-1) 6.75 6.46 4.71 4.86 5.59 5.58 5.37 5.36 4.90 4.93
RMSPE 0.151 0.179 0.024 0.002 0.114
Control group
a CHL(0.78) CZE (0.26) LKA (0.55) IND (0.91) TUR(0.51)
PNG(0.10) PNG (0.26) PER (0.19) THA (0.04) CRI(0.29)
THA(0.08) ZAF (0.25) COL (0.11) TUR (0.02) POL(0.11)
MYS(0.05) BGR (0.23) FJI (0.09) PER (0.02) CZE(0.09)
HUN (0.05) COL (0.01)
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Figure 2: Country-specic costs of sovereign defaults in terms of GDP per capita
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Figure 3: Average costs of sovereign defaults in terms of GDP per capita
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Figure 4: Country-specic costs of sovereign defaults in terms of total exports per capita
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Figure 5: Average costs of sovereign defaults in terms of total exports per capita
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Figure 6: Country-specic costs of sovereign defaults in terms of relative exports
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Figure 7: Average costs of sovereign defaults in terms of relative exports
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Figure 8: Country-specic costs of sovereign defaults: FDI inows per capita
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Figure 9: Average costs of sovereign defaults: FDI inows per capita
Notes: Costs in year eyear after the default.
39Appendix A. Country Coverage
in all samples:
Botswana (BWA) Brazil (BRA) Chile (CHL)
China (CHN) Colombia (COL) Egypt (EGY)
El Salvador (SLV) Fiji (FJI) Hungary (HUN)
India (IND) Malaysia (MYS) Mexico (MEX)
Mongolia (MNG) Papua N. Guinea (PNG) Peru (PER)
Philippines (PHL) Poland (POL) Romania (ROM)
Slovak Republic (SVK) Sri Lanka (LKA) Thailand (THA)
Tunisia (TUN) Turkey (TUR)
added for Ecuador:
Costa Rica (CRI) Czech Republic (CZE) Estonia (EST)
Guatemala (GTM)
added for Argentina:
Cameroon (CMR) Morocco (MAR) Vietnam (VNM)
added for Uruguay:
Jamaica (JAM) Jordan (JOR) Lithuania (LTU)
Panama (PAN) South Africa (ZAF)
added for the Dominican Republic:
Bolivia (BOL) Bulgaria (BGR)
Notes: Country list refers to the analysis of default costs in terms of GDP per capita,
see subsection 4.1 for details.
40Appendix B. Data Sources and Denitions
Name Source Denition
Dependent variables
lngdp Heston et al. (2011) Natural logarithm of PPP converted GDP per
capita (2005 dollars)
lnexports IMF (2011b) and Hes-
ton et al. (2011)
Natural logarithm of the ratio of total exports to
population
rel exports IMF (2011b) Fraction of exports destined for Paris Club creditor
countries
lnfdi World Bank (2011) Natural logarithm of foreign direct investment (net
inows + jlowest sample value (if negative)j) per
capita
Control variables for lngdp
n World Bank (2011) Population growth (annual %)
s Heston et al. (2011) Investment share of PPP converted GDP per
Capita (2005 dollars)
av2school Barro and Lee (2010) Average years of secondary schooling
polity2 Polity IV (2009) Combined policy score ranging from - 10 (strongly
autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic)
Additional control variables for lnexports
latitude La Porta et al. (1999) Rescaled absolute value of the latitude of each
country's capital, ranging between 0 and 1
agr World Bank (2011) Sum of food and agricultural raw materials exports
relative to total merchandize exports
fossils World Bank (2011) Sum of fuel, ores and metals exports relative to
total merchandize exports
Additional control variables for rel exports
lndist CEPII (2011) Natural logarithm of the average physical distance
to Paris Club creditor countries
Additional control variables for lnfdi
ethnic Alesina et al. (2003) Estimated probability that two randomly meeting
citizens belong to the same ethnic group
mobiles World Bank (2011) Number of mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100
people)
telephones World Bank (2011) Number of telephone lines (per 100 people)
41